What takes precedence: price, politics or persistent supply chains? The skeptical observant might say that price always rules. Yet, despite hardening competition from cheaper alternatives, the expensive Middle Corridor holds firm.
When rail container traffic between China and Europe dropped by 22%, RailFreight.com wrote that it was the Middle Corridor losing out most. That view, it turns out, was not quite correct. It is time to take a closer look at the dynamic between maritime container shipping rates, the Middle Corridor, and the northern route through Russia and Belarus.
Because what is actually happening here? Earlier in August, analyst Linerlytica warned of a decade of overcapacity in maritime shipping. Their warning was primarily directed towards the maritime sector. After all, those companies will likely need to make a considerable effort to fill their capacity in the coming years. That could collapse their profit margins if they need to resort to lowering their prices.
The impact on rail
On the Asia-Europe route, rail competes directly with maritime. And for that reason, maritime prices have a direct impact on the rail sector across Eurasia. The warning to the maritime sector could very well be extended to rail: you’re going to face major outside competition in the years to come.
That is not hypothetical, the impact of maritime rates on rail are visible. The 22% drop in container traffic between China and Europe in the first seven months of 2025 coincides with a drop in maritime shipping rates. In 2024, maritime rates were much higher. Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea and the subsequent need to sail around Africa meant lower capacity, higher risk and therefore higher prices.
Cheaper and cheaper
The trade war initiated by the US in 2025 also left its mark on shipping rates, leading to a brief spike in prices. However, the dust seems to have settled, with WCI Drewry showing a decline in prices for the tenth consecutive week.
Now, factor in a possible return of vessels to the Red Sea and the incoming batch of newly ordered ships by the maritime sector. It looks probable that maritime rates will decline even further.
Amid the already ongoing trend of those declining sea rates and the drop in China-Europe rail container traffic, it is not the Middle Corridor, but rather the northern route that is failing. Between January and July 2025, that route saw a total of 147,195 TEU pass via the railways. How different is that from January – July 2024, when that number reached 197,840 TEU. A drop of around 26%.
The Russian route is therefore declining faster than China-Europe traffic as a whole. At the same time, the Middle Corridor is still reporting successes. In the first half of 2025, volumes nearly doubled: from 19,370 to 40,200 TEU. Despite the bottlenecks and their associated costs, the route manages to attract ever more traffic.
What is at play?
All of the above does not necessarily mean that it is China-Europe traffic that has led to the doubling volume on the corridor. Unclear Chinese reporting cast some doubt over that trade flow. It celebrated over 23% of growth towards Central Asia, but remained silent on numbers for Europe-bound traffic. An alternative explanation for Middle Corridor growth could have been surging Central Asian and Caucasian exports to Europe. Those would also be less susceptible to changes in maritime shipping rates.
Fortunately, the acting secretary general of Middle Corridor Association TITR did shed some light on that. “It is worth noting the growth of transit shipments through Kazakhstan: in [the first] six months [of 2025], 262,000 tonnes of transit cargo were transported via TITR [the Middle Corridor], which is 65% more than in the same period last year. The main contribution to the growth is provided by container shipments from China,” she said.
It suggests that there is more at play in the success of the Middle Corridor than only a pricing mechanism. After all, why would the cheaper and faster route through Russia perform worse, lose out to maritime shipping, and the Middle Corridor would not? It may be necessary to look at reasons outside the “market”.
Possible explanations for the trend include de-risking from Russia and businesses betting on the Transcaspian route as a politically safe guarantor of supply chain integrity. There is much less political sensitivity (at least for European importers) towards countries along the Middle Corridor. A continuous strained relationship with Russia heightens risk and limits the types of goods allowed to transit the country. Perhaps the Transcaspian route could provide long-term and predictable solutions.
Despite the Middle Corridor’s successes, the rail freight industry retains a rather pessimistic view of developments in the near future. Whereas this article has mentioned (geo)political factors as a possible reason for its growth, businesses see geopolitics as the number one obstacle to the corridor’s success.