In the past 15 years, China’s high-speed railway (HSR) network has grown explosively. Its length has reached 45,000 kilometres, up from 6,000 kilometres in 2010. It is often seen as a remarkable achievement. Yet, the high-speed network also has its downsides: it is cost-intensive, in some ways badly implemented and hurts the Chinese rail freight industry.
The rise of China’s high-speed rail network remains a feat, even if there might be shortcomings. Tens of thousands of kilometres of rail have connected population centres and allowed for quick travel over long distances.
The Chinese public also sees it that way: it is a sign of the country’s progress after opening up and modernising. Yet, Chinese HSR is not without its problems. Lu Dadao, a former government advisor, rail expert and scientist at the Chinese Academy of Sciences has publicly warned against some of the drawbacks of the HSR network.
Marginalisation of freight
One of Lu’s criticisms is that high-speed rail marginalises the backbone of Chinese railways, freight traffic, in favour of a much less economical type of transport, namely high-speed passenger traffic.
Globally, high-speed rail is predominantly passenger-oriented, and China is no exception. In fact, there are no high-speed lines (defined as allowing for speeds higher than 250 kilometres an hour) in China that facilitate freight traffic. That is because freight traffic does not need such high speeds, says Lu Dadao, but the greater weight of freight trains also complicates operations at very high speeds.
Unlike in China, Europe’s railways do have mixed-traffic HSR lines. For example, some 200-kilometres per hour lines in Germany are considered high-speed, but allow for both passenger and freight traffic. By contrast, freight traffic is excluded from a large part of China’s railway network, which reduces routing options and capacity for goods. Instead, the country’s infrastructure strategy clearly favours high-profile passenger megaprojects.
Subsidising HSR
From a financial point of view, that is not a rational way forward, according to Lu. Only six HSR lines make a profit, the rest is subsidised from elsewhere. “Elsewhere” happens to be the conventional (non-high-speed) railway network, which is still twice as long as the HSR network, at around 100,000 kilometres.
The conventional network remains profitable, not least due to the contribution of freight traffic. “Freight transport is the cost-efficient, high-capacity core of the railway system”, Lu Dadao explained. Yet, its revenues are at least partially used to compensate for the losses of the HSR network. Rail freight thus pays for high-speed passenger rail, which could jeopardise the competitiveness of China’s rail freight.
Lu laments the lack of rationality and planning when it comes to China’s rail strategy. This is reflected not only in the construction of loss-making HSR lines against high costs, but also in local transport integration.
For example, the HSR stations are often remote and do not link up properly with residential areas and inner cities. Similarly to European rail freight, where there is a need for more sidings and dispatch tracks to boost the accessibility of rail, China’s HSR is poorly connected to potential passengers.